In this paper, we exp lore the equilibriu m p roblem of cloud manufacturing system (CM fgS) with cost uncertainty. We propose a CMfgS supernetwork model in wh ich decision-makers (resource service providers (RSPs), the agent and resource service demanders (RSDs)) seek to determine their optimal behavior in an environment with cost uncertainty. The cost uncertainty is represented by random variab les and the decision-makers' risk aversion attitude is modeled by adopting mean-variance utility. The equilibriu m conditions governing the supernetwork model are proposed based on variational inequalities. To investigate the impacts of decision-makers' risk aversion attitude and the degree of cost uncertainty on equilibriu m of CMfgS, we conduct a numerical analysis in this study. The results indicate that a risk averse RSP (or agent) tends to raise selling price to mitigate risk, and a risk averse RSD is willing to pay mo re fo r the needed services . We also show that a risk neutral RSP could sell more services when the variance of cost distribution is relativ e large but the opposite occurs for risk averse RSPs .
Introduction
Cloud manufacturing (CM fg), which was proposed in 2010, is an emerging service oriented manufacturing mode. The core idea of CMfg is manufacturing as a service, and the aim o f it is to realize the free sharing, h igh utilization, and on-demand use of manufacturing resources and capabilities through providing reliab le, on-demand, high quality, cost effective manufacturing services in a cloud manufacturing system (CMfgS) (Tao et al., 2011) .
In CMfgS, there are three kinds of ro les involved in service t ransactions: resource service provider (RSP), resource service demander (RSD), and the agent (also called as cloud operator). The RSPs o wn the manufacturing resources and abilities which are provided to the agent on demand. The RSDs are service consumers. They submit service requirements to the agent and gain optimal services fro m it. The agent is responsible fo r searching, co mb ining, coordinating and managing the required services for meeting RSDs' requirements. After a RSD's request is received by the agent, it searches in the database and propose a reliab le and optimal service scheme for the RSD. When the RSD mod ifies and confirms the service p lan, the agent sends service requests to the selected RSPs. then specific services are organized and launched to meet the RSD's needs. Finally, the service output is sent to the RSD (Wang and Xu, 2013) . In this process, each participant is an independent decision-maker. CMfg S has the advantage of managing dynamic service resources in a systematic and integrated way and provid ing reliab le, on-demand, high quality services for RSDs. With the help of the agent's intelligent management, RSDS need not take much time to select suitable services and design service combination schemes. Though RSPs and RSDs must pay for the agent's management, they can also save much time and money in the process of transaction.
A substantial literature has grown up around service transactions of CMfgS in recent years. Most of these articles mainly focus on transaction process management, such as cost management (e.g., Cheng et al., 2011) , transaction process monitoring (e.g., Morgan and O'Donnell, 2015) , service optimal allocation (e.g., Laili et al., 2012) , etc. while
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Model analysis 2.1 The CMfgS supernetwork model
We use a supernetwork model to illustrate the relat ionship between decision-makers of CMfg S. As depicted in Fig.  1 , the supernetwork consists of three tiers. The top-tier nodes represent m RSPs who are involved in offering manufacturing services. They sell the services to the agent in the second tier. We assume that the RSPs compete with one another in a non-cooperative manner. They need to cover the service costs and the transaction costs and decide what the price should be set and how many services should be supplied.
Agent, which is represented by the second-tier node in Fig. 1 , functions as the intermediary. In fact, there are three agents in CMfgS: interface agent, broker agent and supervision agent (Wang and Xu, 2013) . They work cooperatively to provide high quality and effective intermediary service for RSPs and RSDs. Since there is no co mpetition among these agents, they can be viewed as an integrated whole. The agent transact with RSPs and RSDs , respectively. In an ideal system, the agent is smart enough to deal with the service transactions (Wang and Xu, 2013) . We assume that the agent needs to cover the transaction costs and determine the selling prices and the quantity of the services sold to RSDs in order to maximize its profit.
The bottom-t ier nodes in Fig . 1 represent n RSDs. They transact with the agent to obtain the services needed. We assume that each RSD has an elastic demand, wh ich means that the demand for services depends on other factors like price, quality, etc. The RSDs need to cover the transaction costs and decide the demand as well as the reserve prices.
We denote a typical RSP by i, and a typical RSD by j. For co mpleteness, we first describe the behavior of the decision-makers, and then state the equilib riu m conditions of a CMfgS. Subsequently, we analy ze the impact of risk uncertainty and cost uncertainty on equilibriu m of CMfgS nu merically. The majority of the needed notation is given in Table 1 .
The optimal behavior of decision-makers in CMfgS
In this section, we used three interconnected utility models to describe the optimal behavior and the optimality conditions of RSPs, the agent and RSDs in CMfgS, respectively. The RSPs' and the agent's utility were described in the first two models wh ich considered the decision-makers' net profits. The third model formulated the RSDs ' utilities by establishing the lin k between reserve pay ments and actual pay ments. The decision-makers' risk attitude is incorporated into the three models that are indispensable to the equilibrium analysis of CMfgS. Guo, Peng and Wang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.11, No.2 (2017) 
The behavior of RSPs

In the light of the analyses above, the profit of RSP i , P 1i , can be expressed as follows:
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There are three co mmon models that were used to model risk aversion: mean-variance utility function (Markowit z, 1952) , Value at Risk (VaR) criterion and Conditional Value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion (Madadi, 2014) . But the latter two are suitable for handling rare but long disruptions (Madadi, 2014) . Therefore, we model risk aversion by adopting the mean-variance approach in this paper. Then the utility of RSP i , U 1i , can be written as follows: 
Then the maximu m utility of RSP i can be expressed as:
subject to 0
ii ss .
Assuming that the service cost functions and transaction cost functions are continuously differentiable and convex. Let . Then the optimality conditions for all RSPs can be described simultaneously using the following VI (Nagurney et al., 2007) :
where the optimality solution is marked with an asterisk.
The behavior of the agent
The agent is involved in transaction with both RSPs and RSDs. Since the services cannot be stored by the agent, it is sensible to assume that the total quantity of services sold by the agent is equal to the total quantity of services that it purchased from the RSPs. This assumption can be expressed as the following equation:
Then the profit function of the agent, P 2 , can be expressed as follows:
We have assumed that the agent seeks to maximize its profit . Thus the maximu m utility of the agent can be expressed as:
where  a 0 represents the degree of risk aversion of the agent. 
Assume that the transaction cost functions are continuously differentiab le and convex. Then the optimality conditions for the agent can be expressed as the following VI (Nagurney et al., 2007) : 
The behavior of the RSDs
The main d riv ing force of a service -oriented network is users ' demand for services. As mentioned above, it is assumed that each RSD has an elastic demand for services. Generally, price is an important influence factor of demand since it tends to dominate all other considerations in market transactions. Therefore, we consider that the RSDs ' demand for services depends on the reverse price which is the highest price he/she can afford. Assume the demand function of RSD j is of the following form:
where a embodies the effects of all factors other than price on demand and  denotes the sensitivity of demand to price.
Obviously, the demand function is strictly monotone decreasing and continuously differentiable. In this paper, we only consider RSDs ' utilit ies fro m trad ing with the agent. RSD j 's utility is represented by the margin between his/her reserve payment and actual payment. The larger the margin, the more the RSD j 's utility. Thus the maximu m utility of RSD j can be written as follows:
In an equilibriu m state, the quantity of services sold by the agent to a RSD should equal to the corresponding demand. Then the equilib riu m condition associated with the transaction between the agent and RSD j can be expressed as follows:
As stated in condition (12), in an equilibriu m state, if the equilibriu m price that RSD j is willing to pay for the services is positive, then the demand o f RS D j will be p recisely equal to the quantity of services sold by the agent. If the equilibrium price is zero, then the quantity of services sold by the agent may exceed the actual demand. 
Since every LCP is a VI p roblem (Harker and Pang, 1990) , the Eq. (12) can be formu lated by VI. Thus the optimality conditions for all RS Ds can be formu lated simu ltaneously with the following VI in vector field (Nagurney et 
Proof.
We first prove that the equilibriu m described in Definiti on 1 is consistent with the solution of VI (15). Indeed, summing conditions (5), (9) and (14), after simplifications, yields VI (15).
Then we verify the converse, that is, the solution to VI (15) satisfies the sum of conditions (5), (9) and (14). We add the term   
 
to the second set of brackets. These "terms" don't change the value of Eq. (15) since they equal to zero. Then Eq. (15) can be converted into the sum of conditions (5), (9) and (14). The proof is completed. i s is bounded since it is subject to the constraint of service capacity (i.e., Eq. (3)). We also impose weak constraints to other variables, then the bounded feasible set K b can be written as:  ,  , respectively. Hence, the feasible set K b is compact. The Eq. (16) is reasonable from an economic perspective since the quantity of services and reserve prices must be positive and vary in limited ranges. We can set an upper bound large enough for each of the variab le to ensure that the feasible set is
The equilibrium conditions of CMfgS
In equilibrium state, the optimality conditions for all the RSPs, the optimality conditions for the agent and the optimality conditions for all the RSDs must be simultaneously satisfied so that no decision-maker wants to alter his/her decisions. Definition 1. The equilibrium of CMfgS is one that the flows of services between the tires of the supernetwork model coincide and the flows satisfy the sum of the conditions (5), (9) and (14). , , , 
The upper bounds and lower bounds of all the decision variables were set to 200 and 0, respectively. These random variables were assumed to satisfy normal distribution and were g iven by:
(0, 0.22 (Nagurney et al., 2007) was employed in this paper to address Eq. (17). The convergence criterion utilized was that the difference in the values between two successive iterations no more than 10 -3 . The sequence {  } in the Euler method was set to {1, 1/2, 1/ 2, 1/3, 1/ 3, 1/3, …}. The algorith m was initialized by a group of random solutions.
Influences of decision-makers' risk attitude on equilibrium solutions
The risk aversion attitude was represented by  i ,  j , i =1, 2, j=1, 2 and  a in this study. The RSP i is risk neutral when  i =0 and absolute risk averse when  i =1. And the situation is same for RS D j and the agent. To fully reflect the impact of risk attitude on equilibriu m of CMfgS, the co mbination of different decision-makers' risk attitude was considered in this study. Since the two RSPs (RSDs) have similar behavior, we on ly analyzed the effect of RSP 1 's (RSD 1 's) risk attitude variation on equilibrium solutions.
Influences of RSPs' risk attitude
Let  11 vary fro m 0 to 1 at intervals of 0.1 and other parameters are set as follows:  12 =0,  a =0,  31 =1,  32 =0. We Guo, Peng and Wang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.11, No.2 (2017) will summarize our findings. Fig. 2 shows the variat ion of equilibriu m prices and equilibriu m quantity of services. We can see that all the equilibriu m prices go up with the rise of  11 and all the equilibriu m quantity of services fall with  11 except s 12 . The results indicate that the change in a RSP 's risk attitude has an impact on all the decision-makers' behavior. The higher the degree of risk aversion of a RSP, the higher the service prices, the lesser the quantity of services provided by the RSP, and the more the quantity of services provided by other RSPs . The reason is that the risk loss increases with the quantity of services, thus a conservative RSP tends to raise the price to decrease the trading volume . Benefiting fro m the rise of RSP 1 's price, the demand for RSP 2 's services increases. To equate demand and supply, RSP 2 raises price too. 
Influences of the agent's risk attitude
To analy ze the impact of the agent's risk att itude on the equilibriu m solutions, we let  a vary fro m 0 to 1 at intervals of 0.1 and other parameters are set as follows:  11 =1,  12 =0,  31 =1,  32 =0. The results are depicted in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 Changes of equilibrium solutions as the agent's risk attitude varies.
As shown in Fig. 3 , an increase in  a leads to decreases in s 11 , s 12 , s 21 , s 22 ,  11 and  12 but increases in  21 ,  22 ,  31 and  32 . Our results show that the rise in the degree of the agent's risk aversion causes a decrease in all the equilibriu m quantity of services. A probable exp lanation is that in an environment with uncertainty, the more conservative the agent is, the more possible it tends to raise the selling price to mit igate risk, wh ich leads to the decrease in RSDs' demand. As a result, the RSPs have to reduce the prices in order to reap additional sales.
Influences of RSDs' risk attitude
Let  31 vary from 0 to 1 at intervals of 0.1 and other parameters are set as follows:  11 =1,  12 =0,  a =0,  32 =0. The results are portrayed in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 reveals that an increase in  31 leads to rises in  31 and s 22 but decreases in  11 ,  12 ,  21 ,  22 , s 11 , s 12 and s 21 . An interesting phenomenon is that a risk averse RSD is willing to pay more for the needed services. Our find ing is consistent with Ashgarizadeh and Murthy's conclusion which states that a more risk averse customer is willing to pay a higher price fo r service contract (Ashgarizadeh and Murthy, 2000) . While a risk neutral RSD would lower h is/her reserve price to purchase more services when other RSDs raise their reserve prices. Guo, Peng and Wang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.11, No.2 (2017) 
Influences of cost uncertainty on equilibrium solutions
The degree of uncertainty is exp ressed usually in terms o f a variance or a standard deviation (Chun et al., 2000) . To explore whether the degree of cost uncertainty has an obvious influence on equilibriu m of CMfgS, we analy zed the impacts of variance change (VC) of decision-makers' cost distribution on the equilibriu m solutions. Since the model consists of several random variables, it is unlikely to assess the independent influence of each of them. Hence, we let 
Influences of VC of RSPs' cost distribution
We first analyzed the impacts of VC o f the RSPs' cost distribution. Since the service cost functions and the transaction cost functions are similar, we only focused on transaction cost uncertainty and let  is relat ive large but the opposite occurs for risk averse RSPs. Affected by the rise of the RSPs ' prices, the agent's and the RSDs' prices all increase. Fro m Fig. 6 we can see that the results are very similar to those shown in Fig. 3 , wh ich suggest that a rise in either the degree of the agent's risk aversion attitude or its' cost uncertainty has adverse influences on total trading volu me. The agent plays a crucial role in CM fgS, and a risk neutral agent is conducive to facilitating service t ransaction. The Guo, Peng and Wang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.11, No.2 (2017) most interesting aspect of this graph is that  21 drops down first and then rises up. A probable exp lanation is that lowering price to reap mo re sales is a suitable strategy for the agent when the RSDs are risk averse and the cost uncertainty is low. Since 2 ap  has an impact similar to that of 2 ad  , its results will not be presented in this study. Fig. 6 Changes of equilibrium solutions as the variance of the agent's cost distribution varies. 
Influences of VC of the agent's cost distribution
Influences of VC of RSDs' cost distribution
Conclusions
This study focuses on the equilibriu m problem of CMfgS. We modeled the CMfg S with a three-tier supernetwork. In our analysis, the optimal behavior o f the decision-makers consisting of RSPs, the agent and RSDs were modeled, and the uncertainty of service costs and transaction costs were considered in the model. Based on VI theory, we proposed the equilibriu m conditions of CM fgS. Specifically, we incorporated the impacts of risk att itude and cost uncertainty into the model to provide insights for deeply understanding the decision-makers' transaction behavior. The influences of the decision-makers' risk attitude and the VC o f part icipants' cost distribution on the equilibriu m solutions are investigated through numeric analysis. We summarize some important findings as follows : (1) A change in a decision-maker's risk attitude or variance of cost distribution has an impact on all the participants' behavior. (2) A risk averse RSP (or agent) tends to raise selling price to mitigate risk, and a risk averse RSD is willing to pay more for the needed services, which is consistent with Ashgarizadeh and Murthy's conclusion (Ashgarizadeh and Murthy, 2000) . (3) A risk neutral RSP could sell more services when the variance of cost distribution is relative large but the opposite occurs for risk averse RSPs. (4) Risk attitude variat ion and VC o f cost distribution have analogous impacts on RSDs' behavior.
In our study, the demand functions are linear in p rices, which cannot cover all the possible situations. An extension could be to model RSDs' behavor with other types of demand, like constant elasticity demand and stochastic demand. Guo, Peng and Wang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.11, No.2 (2017) Our wo rk can also be extended by addressing the decision-makers' risk preference with different models such as Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion. Despite the limitations, this research extends our knowledge of equilibrium in CMfgS and will serve as a base for future studies .
